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INTRODUCTION 
Not since George H.W. Bush banned it from the menu of Air 
Force One1 did broccoli receive as much attention as during the legal 
and political debate over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (“ACA”).2  Opponents of the ACA have forcefully and repeatedly 
argued that if Congress has the power to require Americans to pur-
chase health insurance as a means of reducing health care costs, then 
it likewise has the power to require Americans to eat broccoli.  Broc-
coli is mentioned twelve times across the four Supreme Court opin-
ions issued in the ACA decision3—that’s eleven more appearances 
than it had made in all previous Supreme Court decisions combined.4  
As Judge Roger Vinson wrote in his district court opinion invalidating 
the ACA’s minimum coverage provision, accepting the government’s 
position meant that Congress “could require that people buy and 
consume broccoli at regular intervals, not only because the required 
purchases will positively impact interstate commerce, but also be-
cause people who eat healthier tend to be healthier, and are thus 
more productive and put less of a strain on the health care system.”5 
 
 † Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  Thanks to symposium participants at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School and to participants at the New York City Junior Faculty 
Workshop for helpful suggestions.  Daniel Bregman and Melissa Lerner provided excel-
lent research assistance. 
 1 See Broccoli off Bush’s Table, CHIC. TRIB., Mar. 18, 1990, § 1, at 3. 
 2 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 3 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) [hereinafter NFIB] 
(Roberts, C.J.) (mentioning broccoli three times); id. at 2619–20, 2624, 2625 (Ginsburg, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (five times); id. at 2650 (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (four times). 
 4 The only other mention of broccoli in the U.S. Reports is buried within the transcript of 
George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue, which was appended to Justice Stevens’ opin-
ion in the Appendix to FCC v. Pacifica Found.,  438 U.S. 726, 752 (1978). 
 5 Florida ex rel Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1289 (N.D. 
Fla. 2011). 
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An obvious response to what Justice Ginsburg called “the broccoli 
horrible”6 is that, presumptively, neither Congress nor any state may 
require anyone to consume anything.7  Justice Frankfurter wrote for 
the Supreme Court sixty years ago that forcible extraction of the con-
tents of a criminal suspect’s stomach via an emetic solution “shocks 
the conscience” and therefore violates the Due Process Clause.8  It 
would seem to follow a fortiori that force-feeding broccoli to an oth-
erwise sui juris person suspected of nothing but an aversion to eating 
broccoli would also violate either the Fifth or the Fourteenth 
Amendment, depending on whether the force-feeders were federal 
or state officials.  A reasonably competent 1L could recite the Socratic 
dialogue that one would ordinarily expect to follow this observation:  
it would explore the degree to which forcible purchase of health in-
surance is or is not like forcible consumption of food.  The discourse 
would, in other words, test the limits of substantive due process rather 
than the limits of Article I. 
And yet the legal and political discourse surrounding the ACA has 
not taken this form.  Litigation over the individual mandate focused 
on the limits of congressional power embodied within Article I of the 
Constitution, specifically the Commerce Clause9 and the General 
Welfare Clause.10  Challengers to the mandate generally either avoid-
ed due process arguments entirely or gave them rote, superficial at-
tention, and judges deciding the mandate cases followed suit.  This 
litigation choice would make sense if the Article I argument were ob-
viously stronger than the due process argument.  But that is not at all 
obvious, or at least it was not obvious at the start of the litigation.  As 
Part I demonstrates, based on Supreme Court precedent at the time 
of the ACA’s passage, the Article I argument bordered on frivolous 
whereas the due process argument had, and still has, no “all-fours” 
doctrinal obstacles.11 
 
 6 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 7 Cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding a state-ordered compulsory 
vaccination program). 
 8 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing that “a competent person has a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment”). 
 9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
 10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
 11 It is useful to clarify the sense in which I believe the Commerce Clause argument was 
“frivolous.”  I do not mean to say that an attorney advancing such an argument risked 
Rule 11 sanctions or even that any judge accepting such a claim, as five members of the 
Supreme Court did, would be doing so ultra vires the Constitution.  What I mean, rather, 
is that the argument was in the nature of ipse dixit:  a computer equipped with all of the 
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Part II proposes and evaluates a competing set of broadly political 
reasons for the nature of the discourse and, perhaps litigation choice 
in these cases.  Advancing a substantive due process argument would 
have required opponents of the individual mandate and their finan-
cial sponsors to oppose the similar state-level mandate that Mitt 
Romney signed into law as governor of Massachusetts.  A strictly liber-
tarian objection to the individual mandate would also have threat-
ened to rend the fragile coalition between libertarians and social 
conservatives that is essential to the vitality of the Tea Party and that 
ties many Tea Party members to the Republican Party.  Finally, and 
relatedly, opponents of the mandate may have been reluctant to affil-
iate their arguments with the Court’s reproductive freedom prece-
dents, as reliance on substantive due process would inevitably invite.  
The most powerful argument against a health insurance purchasing 
mandate is precisely the one the government conceded (indeed her-
alded) in defending the case:  the mandate interferes with an indi-
vidual’s personal “right to choose” how to allocate health care re-
sources.12 
An additional, non-exclusive set of reasons is neither political nor, 
in a narrow sense, doctrinal, but relates to the sociology of American 
constitutional argument.  As Part III discusses, a substantive due pro-
cess claim would have constituted an argument in favor of “econom-
ic” due process, a doctrine associated with Lochner v. New York13 and 
considered verboten in the wake of the so-called New Deal settle-
ment.  The status of Lochner as an anticanonical case forecloses con-
stitutional arguments well out of proportion to its doctrinal signifi-
cance narrowly construed.  Thus, even as the New Deal settlement is 
said to condemn in equal measure limits on congressional power and 
forms of economic due process, Lochner’s embodiment of the latter 
contributes to what in practical terms is a much more profound re-
pudiation. 
Lochner, then, distorts constitutional argument by stopping eco-
nomic due process in its tracks.  It does so not because such argu-
ments were more forcefully rejected in 1937 than Article I arguments 
 
Supreme Court’s precedents and programmed to extrapolate reasonably from those 
precedents to new sets of facts would have been quite unlikely to invalidate the individual 
mandate as exceeding Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. 
 12 Brief for Petitioners at 33, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 37168 (“As 
Congress expressly found, the minimum coverage provision ‘regulates activity that is 
commercial and economic in nature:  economic and financial decisions about how and 
when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.’”). 
 13 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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grounded in cases like Hammer v. Dagenhart,14 but rather because the 
Due Process Clause is and has been more contested and jurisgenera-
tive than the Commerce Clause.  Lochnerism was inaugurated because 
of the fecundity of Lochner’s libertarianism, not the magnitude of its 
doctrinal errors.  Ironically, then, the cottage industry in Lochner revi-
sionism derives from the same source as the juridical need to repudi-
ate the decision. 
I 
As of March 2012, twenty-two federal court complaints had been 
filed challenging the constitutionality of the individual mandate.15  Of 
 
 14 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 15 Challenges to the Affordable Care Act are summarized at the ACA Litigation Blog.  Brad 
Joondeph, ACA LITIGATION BLOG, http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com (last visited July 
20, 2012).  The complaints in cases challenging the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate are:  First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Baldwin v. 
Sebelius, No. 10-cv-1033 DMS (WMc) (S.D. Cal. 2012), 2012 WL 294466; Complaint Re 
Section 1501, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Boyle v. Sebelius, No. CV11-
07868 GW (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012); Amended Complaint, Kinder v. Geithner, 
No. 10-cv-00101-RWS (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2011), 2011 WL 1576721; Second Amended Civil 
Rights Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Coons v. Geithner, No. CV–10–
1714–PHX–GMS (D. Ariz. May 10, 2011), 2012 WL 3778219; Second Amended Petition 
for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Bryant v. Holder, 809 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Miss. 
Mar. 4, 2011) (No. 2:10-cv-76); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Oklaho-
ma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. CIV11-030-RAW (E.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2011); Second 
Amended Complaint, Florida ex rel Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 780 F. 
Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv.-91-RV/EMT); Amended Complaint for De-
claratory and Injunctive Relief, Peterson v. Obama, 774 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.H. 2011) 
(No. 10–CV–170–JL); Violation Title 28 U.S.C. §1331 & Civil Rights Request for Declara-
tory Judgment Trial by Jury, Purpura v. Sebelius, No. 1904814 (GEB) (D.N.J. 2011), 2011 
WL 1547768; Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.S. Cit-
izens Ass’n v. Sebelius, No. 5:10-cv-01065-DDD (N.D. Ohio 2011), 2011 WL 3200242; Se-
cond Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Ass’n 
of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Sebelius, No. 1:10-cv-0499-RJL (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2010); 
Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, PeopleV.US v. Obama, No. 
2:10-cv-01477-JCL-RJJ (D. Nev. Aug. 31, 2010); Complaint, Calvey v. Obama, 792 F. Supp. 
2d 1262 (W.D. Okla. 2011) (No. CIV–10–353–R); Second Amended Complaint, Liberty 
Univ. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010) (No. 6:10-cv-000-15-nkm); Com-
plaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., No. 1:10-cv-01263-BAH (D.D.C. July 26, 2010); First Amended Complaint for De-
claratory and Injunctive Relief, Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 
1:10-cv-00950 (GK)); Class Action Petition for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Burls-
worth v. Holder, No. 4:10-cv-00258-SWW (E.D. Ark. Apr. 27, 2010); Complaint, Fountain 
Hills Tea Party Patriots, L.L.C. v. Sebelius, No. 2:10-cv-00893-DKD (D. Ariz. Apr. 22, 
2010); Complaint, Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 811 F. Supp. 
2d 1086 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (No. 1:10-cv-00763-CCCC); First Amended Complaint for De-
claratory and Injunctive Relief and Certification Pursuant to L. Civ. R. 11.2, New Jersey 
Physicians Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d. 502 (D.N.J. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-01489(SDW-
MCA)); Complaint, Bellow v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10CV0165 
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those twenty-two complaints, only eleven argued that the mandate to 
purchase health insurance violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.16  Only four of those eleven complaints alleged a 
due process claim in the first four counts,17 and none alleged it as its 
first argument.  Just one district court opinion and no court of ap-
peals opinions have addressed the merits of these substantive due 
process claims.  The one opinion to reach the argument rejected it as 
foreclosed by Lochner and its progeny and the claim was subsequently 
abandoned on appeal.18  By contrast, a majority of the Supreme Court 
 
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2010), 2011 WL 2462205; Complaint, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. 
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-11156-GCS-RSW); Complaint 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 
2010) (No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH). 
 16 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 20, Baldwin v. Sebelius, 
No. 10-cv-1033 DMS (WMc) (S.D. Cal. 2012), 2012 WL 294466; Complaint Re Section 
1501, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act at 91–94, Boyle v. Sebelius, No. CV11-
07868 GW (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012); Second Amended Civil Rights Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 20, 22, Coons v. Geithner, No. CV–10–1714–PHX–
GMS (D. Ariz. May 10, 2011), 2012 WL 3778219; Amended Complaint at 46–55, Kinder v. 
Geithner, No. 10-cv-00101-RWS (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2011), 2011 WL 1576721; Second 
Amended Petition for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 34–36, Bryant v. Holder, 809 F. 
Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2011) (No. 2:10-cv-76); Second Amended Complaint, 
Florida ex rel Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. 
Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv.-91-RV/EMT); Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief at 19–20, U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, No. 5:10-cv-01065-DDD (N.D. 
Ohio 2011), 2011 WL 3200242; Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief at 43, PeopleV.US v. Obama, No. 2:10-cv-01477-JCL-RJJ (D. Nev. Aug. 31, 2010); 
Complaint at 24, Calvey v. Obama, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Okla. 2011) (No. CIV–10–
353–R); Amended Complaint at 24, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010); First Amended Complaint for De-
claratory and Injunctive Relief and Certification Pursuant to L. Civ. R. 11.2 at 9, New Jer-
sey Physicians Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d. 502 (D.N.J. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-01489(SDW-
MCA)); Complaint at 14, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-11156-GCS-RSW). 
 17 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 20, Baldwin v. Sebelius, 
No. 10-cv-1033 DMS (WMc) (S.D. Cal. 2012), 2012 WL 294466; Second Amended Petition 
for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 24, 36, Bryant v. Holder, 809 F. Supp. 2d 563 
(S.D. Miss. Mar. 4, 2011) (No. 2:10-cv-76); Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief at 19–20, U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, No. 5:10-cv-01065-DDD 
(N.D. Ohio 2011), 2011 WL 3200242; Amended Complaint at 24, Florida ex rel McCollum 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010); First 
Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Certification Pursuant to 
L. Civ. R. 11.2 at 9, New Jersey Physicians Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d. 502 (D.N.J. 
2010) (No. 2:10-cv-01489(SDW-MCA)). 
 18 See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 
1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011); Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 648 
F.3d 1235, 1291 n.93 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that the due process ruling was not ap-
pealed). 
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agreed that the individual mandate exceeded Congress’s power un-
der the Commerce Clause.19 
In light of these outcomes, there is every reason to believe that fo-
cusing on federal constitutional limits internal rather than external 
to the Commerce Clause was correct as a matter of litigation strategy.  
This Article does not challenge whether that strategy was correct but 
seeks to explore why it was correct.20  The doctrinal obstacles to inval-
idation of the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause are 
well stated in Justice Ginsburg’s partial dissent and we need not long 
linger on the case here.  In brief, Congress validly legislates pursuant 
to the Commerce Clause when it regulates the channels of com-
merce, the instrumentalities of commerce, or economic activities hav-
ing substantial effects on interstate commerce.21  Congress may also 
target non-economic activity that it reasonably believes must be regu-
lated in order to ensure the effectiveness of a broader regulatory 
scheme that substantially affects interstate commerce.22 
The ACA regulates activities having substantial effects on inter-
state commerce in at least two ways.  First, and most directly, it regu-
lates the decision to self-insure rather than to purchase health insur-
ance on the open market.  Because medical expenses are 
unpredictable, many who choose to self-insure cannot ultimately af-
ford to do so.  Extant legal and social norms require that emergency 
medical care be provided to individuals regardless of ability to pay, 
and the cost of providing that care is passed on in the form of higher 
premiums to those who pay for health insurance.23  Individuals who 
self-insure are also substantially less likely to seek preventive care, and 
so when they do receive care it is disproportionately costly.24 
No one in the litigation before the Supreme Court denied that 
self-insurance has substantial effects on interstate commerce.  The 
crux of the challengers’ argument, rather, was that self-insurance is 
 
 19 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2575 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.). 
 20 Nor have I any quarrel, as a general matter, with legal advocates advancing novel constitu-
tional arguments.  It does seem to be incumbent upon the Supreme Court to exercise 
caution in adopting such arguments, particularly when reviewing landmark congressional 
statutes drafted, debated, and passed in reliance on a well-settled legal framework.  See 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“When the political branches of the 
Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution 
already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will 
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare de-
cisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.”). 
 21 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005). 
 22 Id. at 18–19. 
 23 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 24 See id. at 2612. 
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not economic activity.25  If that claim does not carry its own refuta-
tion, one need look no further than the Court’s decision in Wickard v. 
Filburn,26 in which a farmer’s decision not to enter the wheat market 
was validly subject to regulation on the ground that his decision, ag-
gregated with others similarly situated, substantially affected the price 
of wheat.27  Or to the Court’s more recent decision in Gonzales v. 
Raich, in which a marijuana grower’s decision not to enter the com-
mercial marketplace did not exempt her from the reach of federal 
criminal laws justified under the commerce power precisely because 
“leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control 
would . . . affect price and market conditions.”28 
Neither United States v. Lopez29 nor United States v. Morrison,30 the 
two Rehnquist Court precedents imposing internal constitutional lim-
itations on the reach of the Commerce Clause, implicates any of the 
above reasoning.  The Gun Free School Zones Act, which was invali-
dated in Lopez, sought to regulate possession of a gun near a school, 
which is neither an economic activity itself nor an essential compo-
nent of any existing and constitutionally valid regulatory program.31  
The federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence that 
the Court struck down in Morrison did not itself target economic activ-
ity and was not connected in any direct way to regulation of a com-
mercial market.32  One need not repudiate either case in order to be-
lieve that Congress was on firm constitutional ground in including an 
individual mandate as part of the ACA; it is therefore simply untrue 
that this particular rationale presumes unlimited federal power.33 
There is a second, independent way in which the ACA may (in-
deed, must) be described as a regulation of activity with substantial 
effects on interstate commerce.  The Act is designed, among other 
things, to prevent insurance carriers from discriminating on the basis 
of preexisting medical conditions to a degree that makes the pur-
 
 25 See Brief for Private Respondents on the Individual Mandate at 7–9, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012) (No. 11-398). 
 26 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 27 Id. at 127–28. 
 28 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005); see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 
(1964) (holding that, acting through its commerce powers, Congress could require res-
taurants to serve black customers). 
 29 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 30 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 31 For a concise summary of Lopez, see Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. 549). 
 32 For a concise summary of Morrison, see id. at 25 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. 598). 
 33 See Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits That the Minimum Coverage Provision Respects, 27 
CONST. COMM. 591, 598 (2011) (“[U]pholding the minimum coverage provision would 
not authorize Congress to impose mandates that regulate noneconomic subject matter.”). 
272 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
chase of insurance cost-prohibitive.34  It is, in this sense, a regulation 
of the market for health insurance.  Again, no one in the litigation 
before the Supreme Court denied, nor could plausibly deny, that an 
insurer’s refusing coverage or raising prices on the basis of preexist-
ing conditions is an economic activity substantially affecting interstate 
commerce.35  The individual mandate is included within the statute 
because it is financially infeasible to restrict preexisting condition dis-
crimination without substantially broadening the pool of the insured 
to include people who are unlikely to become extremely sick in the 
near future.36  From this perspective, the individual mandate is justi-
fied as a means of making Congress’s concededly valid regulatory 
scheme effective. 
McCulloch v. Maryland announces the rule governing the scope of 
Congress’s choice of means to effect its constitutionally valid ends:  
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitu-
tion, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted 
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and 
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”37  The Court reiterated 
in a much more recent case, United States v. Comstock,38 that Congress 
may choose any means “that [are] rationally related to the implemen-
tation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”39  Comstock upheld the 
authority of the federal government to confine federal inmates classi-
fied as mentally ill and “sexually dangerous” beyond their terms of 
imprisonment where their state of domicile or trial refuses to assume 
custody.40  The Court upheld this practice on the grounds that con-
finement of such persons helps to ensure the safety of communities 
surrounding prisons, which are themselves rationally related to the 
existence of federal crimes, which are themselves rationally related to 
various substantive enumerated regulatory powers (including the 
power to regulate interstate commerce).41  The link between the indi-
vidual mandate and the regulation of preexisting condition discrimi-
 
 34 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a) (Supp. IV 2011) (prohibiting discriminatory health insurance pre-
mium rates). 
 35 See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 539–40 (1944) (“The modern 
insurance business . . . has become one of the largest and most important branches of 
commerce.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
 36 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2613–15 (U.S. June 28, 2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 37 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). 
 38 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
 39 Id. at 1956. 
 40 Id. at 1954–55. 
 41 Id. at 1958. 
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nation in the health insurance industry is much shorter and much 
tighter than the link upheld in Comstock eight weeks after the ACA 
was signed into law. 
Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause is not 
unlimited, of course, and it is the absence of obvious limits that ani-
mates much of the ACA litigation.42  But Comstock addressed this ob-
jection by referring to the limits embedded within substantive enu-
merated powers and within other provisions of the Constitution.43  
The reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause itself is left “primari-
ly . . . to the judgment of Congress,”44 and certainly does not preclude 
federal regulation of a decision not to do something.  Consider, for 
example, the decision not to file a tax return, or not to register for 
Selective Service, or not to report for federal jury duty.45  And so the 
 
 42 A brief additional word on broccoli and related objections is irresistible.  The most pow-
erful “limiting principle” that prevents a federal broccoli mandate is neither any specific 
legal doctrinal principle nor the principle of political accountability as such.  Cf. Herbert 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:  The Role of the States in the Composition and Se-
lection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (describing the strong 
role of states in American federalism as important safeguards against overbearing Con-
gressional power).  It is more precisely what we might call a principle of social member-
ship.  It is not that any member of Congress supporting a broccoli mandate would be vot-
ed out of office—this kind of political accountability story is premised, implicitly, on the 
vaguely conspiratorial notion that members of Congress would enact tyrannical regula-
tions (for their own sake?) if left unchecked by their constituents.  The more direct ex-
planation for members of Congress not seeking to enact tyrannical regulations is that 
they do not support them.  A society in which the broccoli objection counts as a slippery 
slope argument is one whose elected officials are quite unlikely to support a broccoli 
mandate.  It follows that we cannot actually count on such officials being voted out of of-
fice for supporting the mandate because the society in which such support was possible 
would not find the mandate self-evidently unacceptable. 
 43 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956–57. 
 44 Id. at 1957 (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934)). 
 45 One distinction between failing to file a tax return and failing to purchase health insur-
ance is that the former is regulated only if the person engages in certain prerequisite ac-
tivities, namely earning a specified amount of income, whereas under the ACA the latter 
is not (or so some have claimed).  There are a number of responses to this objection.  
First, the ACA penalty does not in fact apply to everyone who fails to purchase health in-
surance, only those “applicable individuals” who meet certain income requirements and 
are not otherwise exempt, for example, for religious reasons.  See generally 26 U.S.C. 
§ 5000A(d) (2006).  Second, it is not at all clear why either the Necessary and Proper 
Clause or the Sixteenth Amendment would prevent the government from requiring all 
Americans to file a tax return regardless of whether they earned any income.  Third, even 
if either of the first two responses were unavailing, it is difficult to imagine why constitu-
tional significance should attach to the distinction between requiring someone to do 
something by virtue of being human and requiring her to do it only if she earns income 
or engages in some other activity essential to one’s livelihood.  It is true that the Constitu-
tion imposes certain requirements on “direct” taxes, namely that they be proportionate to 
state population.  See U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 4.  But given that the ACA penalty does not 
apply to people who have health insurance, it is plainly not a capitation tax, property tax, 
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Necessary and Proper Clause inquiry either returns us to the Com-
merce Clause itself or refers us to independent constitutional limita-
tions on congressional power, two of which I discuss below.  Note, 
though, that when we frame the internal Commerce Clause inquiry 
in terms of regulating preexisting condition discrimination, the con-
cern over regulation of inactivity disappears, because it is indisputa-
ble that pricing health insurance policies is an economic activity that 
substantially affects interstate commerce. 
The doctrinal explanations just described, in addition to others I 
have reserved,46 led several prominent constitutional scholars to con-
clude that the challengers’ Article I arguments were frivolous.  Akhil 
Reed Amar compared Judge Vinson’s opinion invalidating the indi-
vidual mandate to Roger Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.47  
Andrew Koppelman described the arguments for the constitutionality 
of the individual mandate as “obvious” and the objections as “silly,” 
writing that “no one had heard of [the action/inaction distinction] 
until the mandate’s opponents invented it.”48  Charles Fried called 
the notion that Congress is impermissibly forcing people into the 
health insurance market “a canard that’s been invented by the tea 
party and Randy Barnetts of the world,” adding that he was “aston-
ished to hear it coming out of the mouths of the people on [the Su-
preme Court].”49 
 
or anything else that could reasonably fit the definition of a direct tax.  See NFIB, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566, 2598–99 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.).  Fourth, even if that response were not suffi-
cient, because virtually all people must at some point finance the costs of medical care, 
and because those costs are radically unpredictable, the market for health insurance is 
quite unlike most other markets, and so may easily justify sui generis regulatory strategies.  
Finally, the distinction does not apply to the failure to register for Selective Service or to 
report for jury duty, regulatory requirements that are also justified, if at all, under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. 
 46 As the Court held, Congress’s taxing power is sufficient to justify the individual mandate, 
which is enforced solely by the Internal Revenue Service and whose provisions are con-
tained within the Internal Revenue Code.  See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (Roberts, C.J.).  
The taxing power argument was well-regarded by many in the scholarly community 
throughout the litigation, see, e.g., Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 2–6, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 135050, but it was not a significant focus of public debate 
over the individual mandate until the Court’s decision issued. 
 47 Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Showdown:  A Florida Judge Distorted the Law in Striking Down 
Healthcare Reform, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, at A25. 
 48 Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers:  The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care 
Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 2, 3, 20 n.93 (2011). 
 49 Ezra Klein & Charles Fried, Reagan’s solicitor general:  ‘Health care is interstate commerce.  Is 
this a regulation of it?  Yes.  End of story.’, WONKBLOG (WASH. POST) (Mar. 28, 2012, 1:09 
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/reagans-solicitor-general-
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So much for the constitutional objections to the individual man-
date that are native to the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  The challengers might yet have a case grounded in 
limitations external to Article I.  One possible restriction on congres-
sional power to require Americans to purchase health insurance 
might be the Tenth Amendment.  The Tenth Amendment has histor-
ically been invoked to support the existence of residual sovereign 
power retained by state governments.50  Thus, the Court discussed the 
Tenth Amendment in holding that the federal government may not 
require state law enforcement officers to conduct background checks 
on purchasers of handguns under the Brady Handgun Violence Pre-
vention Act even if it could do so itself or could require private gun 
dealers to do so.51  The text of the Tenth Amendment is not, however, 
limited to protecting state prerogatives.  It reads:  “The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”52  
Challengers to the ACA relied on this language to argue that, just as 
the right to control the actions of state police officers is inherent in 
state sovereignty, an individual’s capacity over health care financing is 
inherent in individual autonomy and cannot be infringed by the fed-
 
health-care-is-interstate-commerce-is-this-a-regulation-of-it-yes-end-of-story/2011/08/
25/gIQAmaQigS_blog. 
 50 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713–14 (1999) (referring to the Tenth Amendment to 
“confirm” the residual sovereign immunity of states); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 935–36 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that an act requiring state offic-
ers to perform background checks on prospective handgun purchasers “violates the 
Tenth Amendment”); id. at 936 (Thomas, J., concurring) (writing separately to empha-
size that the Tenth Amendment “affirms” that the federal government has limited pow-
ers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155–57 (1992) (explaining that, in cases 
implicating vertical separation of powers, the inquiries into the scope of enumerated 
power and the reserved province of state sovereignty “are mirror images of each other”); 
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842–44 (1976) (discussing the Tenth 
Amendment as an affirmation of limits on federal authority to regulate in certain core ar-
eas of state sovereign authority), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273–74 (1918) (“The 
grant of authority over a purely federal matter was not intended to destroy the local pow-
er always existing and carefully reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.”), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941).  See gen-
erally U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848–57 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(elaborating the position that the Tenth Amendment protects powers reserved to the 
people as assembled in states). 
 51 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 919–20. 
 52 U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added). 
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eral government even acting pursuant to otherwise legitimate author-
ity.53 
Let us assume for the sake of argument (and only for its sake)54 
that “the people” as used in the Tenth Amendment refers to individ-
uals rather than a broader body politic.  On that assumption, which is 
required to make sense of the claim, the presence of this novel argu-
ment in the ACA litigation makes even more urgent the question an-
imating this article.  We have a name for powers reserved to individu-
als and not delegated to government:  they’re called rights, and the 
Constitution has a great deal to say about them.  But rather than ar-
gue in a straightforward way that the individual mandate infringes 
upon rights protected by the Fifth Amendment or some other obvi-
ously rights-sensitive constitutional provision, challengers to the 
mandate have embedded their rights claims in roundabout argu-
ments about federalism.  At the start of the litigation, there was no 
case holding, even remotely, that either the constitutional structure 
or the Tenth Amendment itself prevents the federal government 
from conscripting individuals into acting against their will to accom-
plish some federal regulatory objective.55  It makes sense that this 
would be so given that the Court’s rights jurisprudence is substantial 
and available to serve arguments of just this sort.  If someone has no 
right against compelled purchase of health insurance, it is difficult to 
understand why the federal government may not compel that pur-
chase when acting pursuant to otherwise legitimate powers.56 
Challenging the individual mandate primarily on federalism 
grounds would yet make strategic sense if it were abundantly clear 
that there is indeed no constitutional right against compelled pur-
chase of health insurance.  I am not inclined to argue, doctrinally or 
otherwise, for the existence of such a right, but unlike with the Arti-
cle I argument discussed above, precedent at the start of litigation did 
not foreclose the possibility.  Let us begin, as we must, with Lochner.  
Judge Vinson dismissed the substantive due process claim by refer-
 
 53 See Brief for Private Respondents on the Individual Mandate, at 46–49, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012) (No. 11-398). 
 54 See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
801, 825 (2008) (“Prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the term ‘the peo-
ple’ referred to the collective sovereign entity of the citizens of a given state.”). 
 55 Cf. Printz, 521 U.S. at 920 (“‘[T]he Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers 
upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.’” (quoting New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992))). 
 56 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824) (“[The Commerce] power, like all others 
vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.”). 
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ring to the Lochner era:  “[T]his claim would have found Constitu-
tional support in the Supreme Court’s decisions in the years prior to 
the New Deal legislation of the mid-1930’s, when the Due Process 
Clause was interpreted to reach economic rights and liberties.”57  Ac-
cording to Judge Vinson, the right claimed by the challengers was a 
form of economic substantive due process, which the rejection of 
Lochner forecloses. 
A puzzle arises immediately.  In rejecting the due process claim, 
Judge Vinson cited an Eleventh Circuit decision stating that “[a] 
searching inquiry into the validity of legislative judgments concerning 
economic regulation is not required.”58  That is, the substantive due 
process claim failed because the legislative scheme counted as eco-
nomic regulation, but the Commerce Clause claim succeeded be-
cause it did not count as economic regulation.  One gets the distinct 
impression that either a bad argument was disguised as a good one or 
vice versa. 
Anyone making an argument that may reasonably be styled as 
economic substantive due process is certainly on rough constitutional 
terrain.  But government regulation of economic transactions is not, 
ipso facto, immune from substantive due process attack.  The Su-
preme Court held in Carey v. Population Services International that the 
State of New York could not restrict the retail distribution of contra-
ceptives to sales by licensed pharmacists.59  The Court applied strict 
scrutiny to the regulation, because “the same test must be applied to 
state regulations that burden an individual’s right to decide to pre-
vent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting ac-
cess to the means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state 
statutes that prohibit the decision entirely.”60  The lesson of the case, 
consistent with Buckley v. Valeo61 and its progeny,62 is that restrictions 
on financial activity cannot be evaluated in a vacuum but must be 
considered in light of the interests to which the activity is instrumen-
tal.  The State presumptively may not burden fundamental rights, 
and burdens occasioned by commercial regulation are no exception. 
 
 57 Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 
1161 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (internal citations omitted). 
 58 Id. (quoting TRM, Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 941, 945 (11th Cir. 1995)). 
 59 431 U.S. 678, 700–02 (1977). 
 60 Id. at 688. 
 61 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating restrictions on political campaign expenditures). 
 62 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (invalidating a 
prohibition on certain election expenditures by corporations and unions funded out of 
general treasury funds). 
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The appropriate framing question is not, then, whether the gov-
ernment is regulating an economic transaction, but whether, in do-
ing so, the government is infringing upon a fundamental right.  
Whether or not individuals have a fundamental right to self-insure for 
health care cannot be answered by staring harder at the text of Loch-
ner.  A sympathetic rendering of the ACA claim would compare it to 
the case in which, rather than restricting the ability of bakers to con-
tract to work more than sixty hours per week, the New York legisla-
ture had instead restricted the ability of bakers to contract to work 
fewer than sixty hours a week.  Putting aside Thirteenth Amendment 
concerns, Lochner is surely not sufficient to reject a substantive due 
process challenge to such a law. 
A far more germane precedent is Jacobson v. Massachusetts,63 decid-
ed three days before Lochner was argued.  The Jacobson Court upheld a 
compulsory smallpox vaccination program in Massachusetts against a 
due process challenge.64  If the government may, consistent with the 
Due Process Clause, require its citizens to take a potentially danger-
ous vaccine (in the Lochner era, no less!), then may it not a fortiori 
require its solvent citizens to purchase health insurance?65  Not neces-
sarily.  First, the state interest in a mandatory vaccination program for 
a deadly and contagious illness might reasonably (though not inevi-
tably) be described as more compelling than the interest in prevent-
ing either pre-existing condition discrimination by insurers or free-
riding and cost-shifting by health care consumers.  Second, Jacobson 
indeed precedes the effective rejection of Lochner in West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish,66 but it also precedes the revitalization of substantive 
due process in Griswold v. Connecticut.67  And Griswold and its progeny 
are concerned precisely with an individual’s autonomy over private 
decision-making.  Under the modern Due Process Clause, a woman 
has a presumptive constitutional right to determine whether to bear 
or beget a child,68 an individual has both the right to bodily integrity69 
and the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment,70 and even a 
prisoner has a “significant liberty interest” in not being administered 
 
 63 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 64 Id. at 39. 
 65 See Koppelman, supra note 48, at 22–23. 
 66 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 67 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 68 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 69 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–74 (1952). 
 70 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). 
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antipsychotic drugs against his will.71  A panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that this 
line of cases supported a constitutionally protected right to receive 
potentially life-saving experimental drugs.72 
This series of cases has led Abigail Moncrieff to identify a constitu-
tional “freedom of health” that includes “a freedom to reject unwant-
ed medical care and implicitly . . . a freedom to obtain at least certain 
kinds of medical care.”73  If such a liberty interest indeed exists and is 
sufficient to warrant heightened constitutional scrutiny, then the ar-
gument that the government may not compel the purchase of health 
insurance becomes more colorable.  Moncrieff argues that the indi-
vidual mandate raised constitutional questions because it effectively 
required consumers to pay for care through a system that interposes a 
third-party auditor between the individual and her physician’s health 
care choices.74  More broadly, a right to direct one’s own medical care 
might reasonably be threatened by a system that requires limited 
funds to be spent on health insurance rather than saved for future 
care insofar as it uses (commandeers?) the consumer’s own finances 
to alter the costs and benefits of particular care options.  Routine and 
preventive care, rationally avoided in the absence of the mandate, is 
made a moral hazard under the ACA.75 
Moncrieff ultimately concludes that to the extent there is a pre-
sumptive constitutional objection to the individual mandate ground-
ed in the freedom of health, the presumption of unconstitutionality 
is overcome by a sufficiently compelling governmental interest and 
the narrow tailoring of the individual mandate’s remedial scheme.76  I 
agree, and I am less certain than Moncrieff that the most reasonable 
interpretation of the Court’s cases supports a broad “freedom of 
health.”  The important point, however, is not whether I believe the 
substantive due process argument is a loser, but why virtually every-
one of consequence in the massive litigation over the ACA appeared 
to hold the same view, even as many of those same people were un-
 
 71 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990). 
 72 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 
470, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 73 Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 2237 (2011). 
 74 See id. at 2249–50. 
 75 See Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979) (identifying 
the moral hazard created by the presence of insurance and proposing a formal model 
evaluating mitigation strategies); cf. Moncrieff, supra note 73, at 2248 (noting that the 
ACA’s mandate is not satisfied by “the most freedom-preserving” forms of insurance cov-
erage such as high-deductible sickness and accident insurance). 
 76 See Moncrieff, supra note 73, at 2250–51. 
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moved by seemingly persuasive defenses of congressional power un-
der Article I. 
In different terms, we may identify the litigation choices in this 
case, and the judicial responses to those choices, as emblematic of an 
aggressive, but distinctly partial, unsettling of the New Deal settle-
ment.  As Larry Kramer writes, the New Deal settlement entailed “the 
Court restor[ing] to politics questions respecting the definition or 
scope of the powers delegated by the Constitution to Congress and 
the Executive, subject only to a very limited rational basis scrutiny.”77  
As indicated by Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene Products,78 it 
also entailed “more exacting judicial scrutiny” for certain individual 
rights79 but not for others, namely those represented by Lochner and 
falling generally under the category of economic and social rights.80  
The ACA litigation placed the twin pillars of the New Deal settlement 
in sharp relief, and pulled them apart.  Under the settlement, both 
the Article I and the substantive due process claims against the indi-
vidual mandate should have been off limits.  In reality, only one was. 
II 
It is possible to tell a reasonably powerful but wholly extralegal 
story about the paucity of substantive due process claims in this litiga-
tion and in its surrounding discourse.  Like many good stories, it be-
gins where the money trail ends. 
Consider the following.  The litigation immediately before the 
Court in the ACA litigation81 was brought by twenty-six states, two pri-
vate plaintiffs, and the National Federation of Independent Business 
(“NFIB”).  The NFIB is a business lobbying organization funded in 
part by the Claude R. Lambe Charitable Foundation, which is con-
 
 77 Larry D. Kramer, Foreword, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 122 (2001) (internal cita-
tions omitted). 
 78 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 79 Id. 
 80 See id. at 152; see also Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”:  Lochner and Constitu-
tional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 686 (2005) (discussing the Lochner narrative in 
which "the New Deal revolution produced a new breed of Justices who believed in judicial 
restraint and appropriate respect for democratic processes in ordinary social and eco-
nomic regulation"); Kramer, supra note 77, at 121 (explaining that, under the New Deal 
settlement, the Court "reserved room for 'a more exacting judicial inquiry' to protect a 
broad category of individual rights, including those specified in or inferred from the Bill 
of Rights and Reconstruction Amendments; those pertaining to voting and the political 
process; and those necessary to protect racial, religious, or other 'discrete and insular mi-
norities.'"). 
 81 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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trolled by Charles G. Koch.82  Koch’s brother David endorsed Mitt 
Romney for President in 2008 and hosted a major fundraiser in the 
Hamptons for Romney in 2010.83  The Kochs’ brother Bill and his 
coal company, Oxbow Carbon, donated $1 million to Romney’s Su-
per PAC, Restore Our Future, in 2011.84  David Koch is a co-founder 
of and has donated more than $1 million to Americans for Prosperi-
ty, among the most significant financial and logistical backers of the 
Tea Party movement.85  All of the plaintiffs, including the states, were 
represented by David Rivkin and Lee Casey of BakerHostetler.86  Riv-
kin and Casey were legal advisors to Romney on his justice advisory 
committee throughout the primary season and, as of this writing, re-
main two of his most high-profile supporters within the legal com-
munity.87 
In other words, the litigation against the ACA has been funded 
and directed in significant part by a network of elite Republicans 
committed to Mitt Romney’s presidential aspirations and to the sus-
tenance of the Tea Party movement.  If the individual mandate vio-
lates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause then it also violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.88  A successful sub-
stantive due process argument against the individual mandate would 
therefore mean that the only other American executive to sign such a 
mandate into law, Mitt Romney, would have supported equally un-
constitutional health care legislation.  Significant litigation backed by 
 
 82 See Robert Greenwald & Jesse Lava, Koch Brothers v. Health Reform, OPEN SALON (Mar. 26, 
2010, 3:41 PM), http://open.salon.com/blog/robert_greenwald/2012/03/26/ koch_bro
thers_v_health_reform. 
 83 See Ari Berman, Romney’s Koch Brothers Connections, NATION (Feb. 24, 2012, 12:56 PM), 
http://www.thenation.com/blog/166447/romneys-koch-brothers-connections; Maggie 
Haberman & Kenneth P. Vogel, GOP mega-donors look toward 2012, POLITICO.COM (Oct. 
23, 2010, 5:33 PM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=DAEF889F-ABE-
91FE58FF12C47CE0C5A7. 
 84 See Ian Duncan & Matea Gold, Romney Backers Test a Ban on Donors, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 
2012, at A1, A7. 
 85 See Jane Mayer, Covert Operations:  The Billionaire Brothers Who Are Waging a War Against 
Obama, NEW YORKER, Aug. 30, 2010, at 44, 46, available at http://www.newyorker.com/rep
orting/2010/08/30/100830fa_fact_mayer?printable=true; Laurie Bennett, Tracking Koch 
Money and Americans for Prosperity, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2012, 10:35 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lauriebennett/2012/03/31/tracking-koch-money-and-
americans-for-prosperity/. 
 86 Amended Complaint at 33, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010). 
 87 See Ashley Killough, Bork to co-chair Romney justice committee, CNN.COM (Aug. 2, 2011, 12:12 
PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/02/bork-to-co-chair-romney-justice-
committee. 
 88 See generally Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 
408 (2010). 
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establishment Republicans and premised on the unconstitutionality 
of Romney’s signature legislative achievement would have been deep-
ly threatening to Romney’s Republican primary prospects and, there-
fore, to the possibility of a Republican victory in the 2012 presidential 
election.  Threading the federalism needle would be a rational strat-
egy for anyone with this suggested set of priorities. 
Quite apart from Romney’s presidential prospects, the link be-
tween the Tea Party movement and the Republican Party, so vital to 
Republican political energy in 2010 and since, has depended on 
tempering the Tea Party’s fundamentalist libertarian elements and 
supporting its anti-Washington impulses.  As has been well-
documented,89 the modern Republican Party comprises a tenuous co-
alition of economic and social conservatives, a partial result of Wil-
liam F. Buckley’s and Frank Meyer’s famous “fusion” strategy.90  Liber-
tarianism that takes the form of anti-regulatory zeal directed at 
Congress is harmonious with that fusion, whereas a purer form of an-
ti-statist libertarianism is threatening to it.  Tea Party supporters ap-
pear to be divided between libertarians on one hand and fiscal and 
social conservatives on the other.  Based on extensive survey research 
conducted during the fall of 2010, Emily Ekins concludes that “[t]he 
Tea Party seems unified on role of government questions regarding 
economics and business; however, they are roughly split in half about 
the government promoting a particular set of values.”91  Libertarians 
within the Tea Party align with Democrats on social and cultural is-
sues but align with Republicans on economic issues.92  Conservatives 
within the Tea Party align with Republicans on both sets of issues.93  
Challenging the ACA as an overreach by Washington can be support-
ed not only by establishment Republicans but also by both wings of 
the Tea Party, whereas challenging the ACA as more generally statist 
threatens to split significant elements of the Tea Party from the Re-
publican mainstream. 
 
 89 See GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 
1945, at 235 (Intercollegiate Studies Inst. 1996) (1976). 
 90 See John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, THE RIGHT NATION:  CONSERVATIVE POWER 
IN AMERICA 51 (2004); Kevin Smant, PRINCIPLES AND HERESIES:  FRANK S. MEYER AND THE 
SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 49–52 (2002). 
 91 Emily McClintock Ekins, The Character and Economic Morality of the Tea Party Move-
ment, 1, 27 (Sept. 5, 2011) (unnumbered working paper presented at the 2011 American 
Political Science Association Annual Meeting, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1902394). 
 92 Id. at 23–24. 
 93 Id. 
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Relatedly, the unity of the Republican coalition requires official 
opposition to abortion rights.  Pro-abortion rights Republican politi-
cians, once common, are nearly extinct, and hostility to Roe v. Wade94 
remains the most significant, if at times sub rosa, litmus test for Re-
publican judges.  An integrated political and legal strategy for over-
turning the ACA must, like any strategy that relies on mass conserva-
tive mobilization, be compatible with Roe’s incorrectness.  But it is 
difficult to conceive of a competent legal brief advocating invalida-
tion of the individual mandate on due process grounds that does not 
rely on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,95 which 
affirmed the “essential holding” of Roe.96  The controlling joint opin-
ion in Casey states that “[i]t is a promise of the Constitution that there 
is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter”97 
and that “[o]ur law affords constitutional protection to personal deci-
sions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela-
tionships, child rearing, and education.”98  The freedom to make 
healthcare decisions arguably falls within the carapace that these var-
ious decisional rights erect, and indeed the individual mandate re-
quires consumers to purchase insurance plans that provide coverage 
for “maternity and newborn care” and “pediatric services.”99  The 
mandate therefore affects an individual’s allocation of financial re-
sources to competing health care options; that allocation decision is 
plausibly covered by the liberty interests articulated in Casey.  That 
language from Casey, moreover, was co-authored by Justice Kennedy, 
who most observers assumed would be a significant swing vote in the 
ACA litigation.  To rely on a substantive due process argument but to 
eschew reliance on the Court’s controlling abortion decision would 
border on legal malpractice. 
To be clear, none of the above is offered as either psychoanalysis 
or investigative journalism.  I have no special insight into the actual 
reasons that motivated the choice to rely on federalism arguments 
and not to rely on substantive due process.  It may suffice as explana-
tion to note that the choice was likely correct strategically, on which I 
have more to say in Part III.  And even if the lawyers, funders, and cli-
ents making that choice were motivated by the kinds of political con-
 
 94 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 95 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 96 Id. at 846. 
 97 Id. at 847. 
 98 Id. at 851. 
 99 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(b)(1)(A)–(J), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18022(b)(1)(A)–(J) (Supp. IV 2011). 
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siderations I have discussed, cognitive dissonance may well have led 
them to experience their decision-making process as free from such 
influences.  At a minimum, however, this Part demonstrates that, in 
the context of the ACA litigation, there were substantial political ob-
stacles to reliance on substantive due process.  Whatever the doctrinal 
benefits of doing so might have been, the strategic costs were likely 
much higher. 
III 
The story Part II tells remains incomplete.  It gestures suggestively 
a partial explanation for the litigation choices of some prominent 
challengers to the individual mandate, but it does not explain the re-
sponses of judges to the substantive due process claims that have in 
fact been made.  As discussed above, Judge Vinson ruled that the in-
dividual mandate was unconstitutional but was quite skeptical of the 
substantive due process argument.  Judge Sutton referred to the due 
process version of the plaintiff’s argument in the individual mandate 
challenge rejected by the Sixth Circuit: 
Why construe the Constitution . . . to place this limitation—that citizens 
cannot be forced to buy insurance, vegetables, cars and so on—solely in a 
grant of power to Congress, as opposed to due process limitations on 
power with respect to all American legislative bodies?  Few doubt that the 
States may require individuals to buy medical insurance, and indeed at 
least two of them have.  The same goes for a related and familiar man-
date of the States—that most adults must purchase car insurance.  Yet no 
court has invalidated these kinds of mandates under the Due Process 
Clause or any other liberty-based guarantee of the Constitution.  That 
means one of two things:  either compelled purchases of medical insur-
ance are different from compelled purchases of other goods and services, 
or the States, even under plaintiffs’ theory of the case, may compel pur-
chases of insurance, vegetables, cars and so on.  Sometimes an intuition is 
just an intuition.100 
Judge Sutton treats the absence of successful due process claims 
against the individual mandate as evidence that such claims are inad-
equate.  It may well be that judges who have rejected the substantive 
due process argument have been socialized into a political culture 
that prioritizes limits on federal power over aggrandizement of indi-
vidual rights.  That argument, however, is speculative, vaguely para-
noid, and happily unnecessary.  The better view links the doctrinal 
account of Part I with the socio-political account of Part II to arrive at 
 
100 Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 565 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concur-
ring) (internal citations omitted). 
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a more complete picture of the legal status of economic due process 
arguments.  In brief, Lochner’s status as an anticanonical case, which 
results in large measure from its compatibility with other rights-based 
claims, distorts doctrinal arguments about economic rights. 
Lochner is the dean of the anticanon.101  No case is more consistent-
ly labeled anticanonical by academics;102 no repudiated case more 
consistently receives significant treatment in leading constitutional 
law casebooks;103 and no case is negatively cited more frequently in 
modern Supreme Court opinions.104  As David Strauss writes, “[y]ou 
have to reject Lochner if you want to be in the mainstream of Ameri-
can constitutional law today.”105 
A judicial decision does not acquire this unhappy status by hap-
penstance or even through the ordinary operation of the common 
law.  Within the U.S. constitutional tradition, the few cases that be-
come strongly anticanonical are the detritus of regimes that suc-
cumbed to constitutional revolutions.  The Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion represent the repudiation of Dred Scott v. Sandford; the New Deal 
settlement represents the repudiation of Lochner; and the Second Re-
construction represents the repudiation of Plessy v. Ferguson.106  One 
of the functions of anticanonical discourse is to reconcile constitu-
tional continuity with the rejection of the traditions these cases repre-
sent.  We persuade ourselves that these cases were wrong the day they 
were decided so that we may assure ourselves that we are not as one 
with a people committed to slavery, to sweatshops, and to Jim Crow.107 
Under the circumstances, it is not enough for someone arguing in 
favor of a form of economic due process to dance around the un-
yielding Lochner precedent.  She must confront it directly, proactively, 
and successfully.  The oral argument in Florida v. Department of Health 
and Human Services was devoted largely to articulating and debating a 
limiting principle to the federal government’s assertion of regulatory 
power under the Commerce Clause.108  Had the litigation instead fo-
cused on substantive due process, the argument (in the unlikely 
event it made it to the Supreme Court) would instead have focused 
 
101 See generally Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011) (discussing the 
role of Lochner and other cases that stand as exemplars of constitutional law gone wrong). 
102 Id. at 391. 
103 Id. at 395. 
104 Id. at 398. 
105 David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (2003). 
106 Greene, supra note 101, at 468. 
107 See Balkin, supra note 80, at 709–10. 
108 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16–18, 23, 27–31, 39–45, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 
(2012) (No. 11-398). 
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on how the challengers’ claims differed from the claims accepted in 
Lochner.  In fact, Lochner made several appearances at the Supreme 
Court oral argument even without any due process claim to speak of.  
Solicitor General Donald Verrilli argued that “to embark on the kind 
of analysis that [the challengers] suggest the Court ought to embark 
on is to import Lochner-style substantive due process.”109  Later in the 
argument, Chief Justice Roberts said that “it would be going back to 
Lochner if we were put in the position of saying, no, you can use your 
commerce power to regulate insurance, but you can’t use your com-
merce power to regulate this market in other ways.”110  And Justice So-
tomayor asked Paul Clement, arguing on behalf of the respondents, 
“Is this a Lochner era argument that only the States can [require the 
purchase of insurance], even though it affects commerce?”111 
Notice that each invocation of Lochner associated the case with a 
different substantive proposition.  The first tied Lochner to the notion 
that unenumerated liberty interests limit governmental regulatory 
power; the second to the notion that courts should import “nested 
oppositions” such as activity/inactivity or direct/indirect into judicial 
review of federal power;112 the third to the notion that the Tenth 
Amendment or its equivalent acts as an independent limitation on 
otherwise valid exercises of federal authority.  None of these proposi-
tions needs to be linked to Lochner, and indeed the latter two align 
more closely with cases like Hammer v. Dagenhart113 and Carter v. Carter 
Coal Co.,114 which invalidated federal statutes.  Moreover, notwith-
standing their association with Lochner, none of the three proposi-
tions is fully discredited.  All of modern substantive due process juris-
prudence involves limitations that unenumerated liberty interests 
place on regulatory power; the nested opposition of econom-
ic/noneconomic is a fixture of modern Commerce Clause case law; 
and New York v. United States115 and Printz v. United States116 are difficult 
to understand in the absence of an external limit on congressional 
power grounded in federalism concerns. 
 
109 Id. at 30. 
110 Id. at 39. 
111 Id. at 66–67. 
112 See Jack M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1669 (1990) (reviewing JOHN M. 
ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION (1989)); Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 
42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 112–16 (1991). 
113 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
114 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
115 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
116 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
Oct. 2012] WHAT THE NEW DEAL SETTLED 287 
 
Lochner, then, is the hardest-working case in the U.S. Reports.  It is 
both a synecdoche and a rhetorical resource.  Its unquestionably 
negative valence enables it to stand in for—and thereby to attack—a 
very broad set of propositions, even some that, in other contexts, are 
embedded within our constitutional tradition.  One such proposition 
is economic due process.  Even if we can rather easily distinguish 
statutory invalidation of a labor contract from statutory compulsion 
to enter into an insurance contract, Lochner casts a shadow—a pe-
numbra, if you will—over the entire enterprise.  It forces recalcula-
tion of the anticipated costs and benefits of advancing certain kinds 
of claims and therefore may strongly distort doctrinal argument.  
Like an athletic seven-footer, Lochner alters even the shots that it can-
not block. 
An irony bears mention.  Lochner’s anticanonicity, its stickiness as a 
negative precedent, both motivates and derives from its usefulness 
across the ideological and doctrinal spectrum.  Lochner became anti-
canonical in the late 1960s and early 1970s, not because advocates 
and judges suddenly discovered that economic due process was a los-
ing claim but rather because they discovered that noneconomic due 
process was a winning one.117  Lochner is an instrument of opposition, 
not affirmative argumentation, and so its effectiveness has expanded 
in proportion to the numerosity of its potential targets.  Griswold118 
and its progeny provided conservatives with reason to invoke Lochner 
as a negative precedent, and liberals, who had long embraced anti-
Lochner rhetoric, continued to do so as a means of distinguishing 
progressive due process arguments from conservative ones.119  And so 
it is the conceptual generativity of due process arguments that en-
genders Lochner’s anticanonicity.  Lochner revisionism, rampant within 
the legal academy and at conservative think tanks,120 may be better 
described as a feature of Lochner’s anticanonical status than as a 
threat to it. 
It remains to explain why Lochner does not effectively condemn 
federalism arguments—the other claims the New Deal settlement was 
thought to have settled—even as many seek to call it to that service.121  
The answer may be, in part, that Griswold, and later Roe, have helped 
to fix the socio-legal meaning of Lochner as a case about economic 
 
117 See David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York:  A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1469, 1473 (2005); Greene, supra note 101, at 454–55. 
118 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
119 See Greene, supra note 101, at 453–56. 
120 See id. at 417. 
121 See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text. 
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due process and unenumerated rights rather than as a full-fledged 
stand-in for limitations on governmental regulatory authority.  Abor-
tion rights cases give liberals strong reason to defend substantive due 
process and therefore give conservatives strong reason to attack it.  
Economic due process gives some conservatives strong reason to de-
fend substantive due process and so gives liberals strong reason to at-
tack it.  By contrast, one finds strong critics of broad congressional 
power almost exclusively on the political right, and so states’ rights 
arguments are not universally deployed.  Federalism has not found its 
Lochner because it has not found its Roe. 
CONCLUSION 
The force of the broccoli objection derives from its self-evident 
incompatability with liberal democratic premises.  And yet the logic 
of the ACA challengers’ principal argument would suggest no consti-
tutional infirmity in a state-level mandate to purchase (and con-
sume?) broccoli.  There is no conceptual incongruity in the notion 
that we have rights that only states, and not the federal government, 
may infringe.  The right to a grand jury122 and to a civil jury trial123 are 
among those rights,124 and we get along fine with that tension.  More-
over, the idea that the federal structure is not concerned with limita-
tions on centralized power for its own sake but rather for the sake of 
rights protection has a lengthy and distinguished intellectual histo-
ry.125 
 But there is little reason in principle to suppose that among the 
rights less protected as against states than as against the federal gov-
ernment is the right to refuse participation in an interstate commer-
cial market.  And if such a right is among those the federal govern-
 
122 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
123 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
124 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3035 n.13 (2010). 
125 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 180–81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (“[I]n a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely 
the masters of their own fate.  Power being almost always the rival of power, the general 
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state govern-
ments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government.  The 
people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate.  If 
their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of re-
dress.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first di-
vided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivid-
ed among distinct and separate departments.  Hence a double security arises to the rights 
of the people.  The different governments will control each other, at the same time that 
each will be controlled by itself.”). 
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ment has less leeway to infringe, then surely the reason for that is 
grounded not in limitations inherent in Article I, but in independent 
limitations housed within the Bill of Rights.  Putting principle aside, 
there is still less justification in pre-ACA doctrine for the suggestion 
that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper 
Clause permits regulation of self-insurance for medical costs but that 
the Fifth Amendment has nothing to say about the matter. 
 The most persuasive explanation for this confusing mix of propo-
sitions rests neither in principle nor in doctrine, but rather in party 
politics and in our socio-legal culture.  A substantive due process at-
tack on the individual mandate would threaten Mitt Romney’s politi-
cal prospects and Republican Party unity, would associate conserva-
tives with reproductive freedom precedents, and perhaps as 
significantly, would place Lochner, rather than broccoli, at the center 
of the legal argument.  Yuck. 
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